How do international organizations (IOs) respond to their member states’ blame attributions? The existing literature often depicts IOs as blame takers that are unable and unwilling to actively avoid the blame that is shifted to them by their member state governments. They are considered good scapegoats. We argue, by contrast, that IOs are not always passive blame takers, but active blame avoiders. In some cases, they are willing to ignore the attribution of blame by their member states, but in other cases they try to defend their policies against criticism or even shift blame for criticized policies back onto their member states. We suggest that how the leadership of IOs responds to their member states’ criticism for policy failures depends – among other things – on their authority. When IOs wield pooled authority, they are likely to strategically ignore their member states’ criticism; when IOs exercise delegated authority, they are likely to defend the policies they are blamed for; and when IOs wield nested authority – i.e., when authority shared by administrative IO bodies and member states – they are likely to shift blame back onto their member states. We probe this proposition by assessing the responses of the World Health Organization, the United Nations, and European Union in nine cases of criticised global health policies, security policies, and migration policies. Our findings suggest that by actively avoiding blame, IO leaders contribute to the overall accountability of international politics.